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Some Corner of a Chinese Field: The Politics of Remembering Foreign Veterans of the 
Taiping Civil War* 
Short title: Politics of Remembering Foreign Veterans 
 
Abstract 
The memory of the foreign involvement in the Taiping war lasted long after the fall of the Taiping capital at 
Nanjing in 1864.  The events were commemorated by various actors, Chinese and foreign from the end of the 
war until the end of the treaty port century in 1943 when the right to extraterritoriality was abrogated.  This 
article explores the commemorations of the foreign role through three media: the issuing of medals to foreign 
fighters, the building of memorials to the foreign dead and the writing of histories of the events.  Across these 
media different interest groups used the foreign interventions as a proxy for continuing debates about the role of 
foreigners in China and about China’s place in the world.  More broadly the commemorations of the role of 
foreign fighters in the Taiping war is a case study in the transnational politics of memory.  The memories of the 
war were not just contested or commemorated by states but also by individuals and groups whose views often 
diverged from those of their government.  By tracing how memories of the war were remembered and forgotten 
we can trace the insecurities of different interest groups over time and their perceived power relative to each 
other. 
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Introduction 
   The Temple of Elegant Loyalty (文忠寺 Wen Zhong Si) was commissioned by the Qing 
government to commemorate the service of high official Li Hongzhang against the Taiping.  
Its name derived from the honorific granted to Li upon his death in accordance with Qing 
commemorative practices. According to the North-China Herald, however, the ‘common 
people’ of Wuxi, the city in which the memorial was constructed, called it ‘the temple of the 
man who sold his country’ (卖国寺 Mai Guo Si), a reference to concessions Li had been 
forced to make in diplomatic negotiations with Russia.
1
  This anecdote underscores a problem 
with fixing meaning to historical events and actors through acts of commemoration.  This 
article will explore how different groups and individuals sought to fix the meaning of the 
foreign interventions in the Taiping war (1850-1864).  The debates these commemorations 
sparked became proxy for debates among foreign and Chinese actors about the extent of the 
foreign role in China and, by extension, the scope of Chinese sovereignty.  More broadly, the 
commemoration of the interventions offers a case study in the politics of war memory in a 
transnational setting.  The differing agendas of the groups involved created multidirectional 
waves of commemoration as the activities of one interest group inspired both complementary 
and contrasting commemorations of the period among others.  At the same time, as 
transnational, these commemorations were prone to highlight distinctive differences in Qing, 
European and American memorial cultures, provoking as many disputes over the form of 
commemorations as over their content. 
 
   The Taiping civil war (1850-64) broke out when Hong Xiuquan, a failed civil service 
examination candidate who believed himself to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ, 
declared his intention to overthrow China’s Qing dynasty (1644-1911).2  Hong’s call to arms 
came just as British, American and French communities had established their privileged 
position on the China coast, underwritten by the treaties which followed the Qing defeat in 
the Opium War (1839-42).  Although some foreigners fought as mercenaries for both sides in 
the conflict as early as 1853, many more became involved after the Taiping armies advanced 
on the treaty port of Shanghai in 1860 and 1862.
3
  These advances were repulsed by British 
and French troops as foreign diplomats felt that the Taiping threatened trade and the security 
of foreign landlords’ property in the city.4  Although the Anglo-French force abstained from 
further intervention after 1862, British, French and American officials continued to support 
their citizens serving as mercenaries commanding Qing troops.  Although more commonly 
known among Chinese scholars as the Taiping Rebellion, or the Taiping Revolutionary 
Movement, as several American scholars have recently pointed out the conflict is more aptly 
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cast as a civil war.
5
  With a death toll of upwards of twenty million people this was not a 
rebellion which faced inevitable suppression, but a contest between two competing states for 
China’s future, and one in which the outcome was far from certain. During the bloody 
campaigns in Jiangnan in the last four years of the war hundreds of foreign fighters serving 
the Qing died, though many admittedly from disease.  This led to the vexed question of how 
to remember these men and of how to commemorate the service of those veterans still living.   
 
   The memories of these events must be set in two frames, that of lived experience and that 
of collective historical memory. Memory cannot be reduced to an individual 
phenomenological experience.  Historians of memory, whether their focus is on individuals 
giving voice to their own, often traumatic, experiences, as with holocaust survivors, or on the 
construction of collective narratives, such as those of nation states, have accepted that 
memories are also social.
6
  Even our personal narrative memories are constructed in a 
dialogue with those around us.
7
  Individual and social memories typically have a lifespan of 
no more than eighty years, passing with the generation that experienced and constructed them.  
As Aleida Assmann points out, when memories cross this barrier in time they become 
mediated, relying not on a collection of experiences but on artefacts, memorials and 
collective commemorations.
8
  Once memories pass out of the realm of an individual lifespan 
they are no longer experiences people have but rather narratives that are made.
9
  Some of 
these narratives are actively remembered while others are ‘archival’ memories, that is to say 
they reside in a set of artefacts, documents and symbols which are not currently significant 
but may in future be drawn on to construct or bolster collective identities.
 10
  We must 
therefore ask why, at any given point, some memories are given prominence over others.
 
 The 
memory of the foreign veterans of the Taiping war faded after the fighters themselves 
dispersed from China in the years after the conflict’s end. It was stored, however, in the local 
foreign and Chinese communities’ archival memory, to be remembered when the presence of 
foreigners in the country was challenged by rising Chinese nationalism in the 1920s.  
 
  This study complements a growing literature on the commemoration of foreign fighters in 
civil wars and of the memory of the Taiping war in particular. The foreign interventions in 
the Taiping conflict were not unique.  The involvement of the international brigades in the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), for example, also raised disputes about how foreign fighters 
should be commemorated.
11
  Nevertheless, the memory of foreign contributions to a war 
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within a host nation are usually subsumed by attempts to come to terms with the memory of 
the war as a whole such that commemoration becomes a matter for the fighters’ home nation, 
if at all.
 12
  The Taiping case is unique because a foreign community with exclusive privileges 
including exemption from Chinese law remained in China for almost eighty years after the 
war’s end.    This fact added to the tensions Tobie Meyer-Fong has recently highlighted 
within the Qing government over efforts to commemorate its victory over the Taiping, which 
lasted until the dynasty’s fall in 1911.13 Memories of the foreign role in suppressing the 
Taiping were no less contentious, but had a longer afterlife, lasting at least as long as foreign 
treaty privileges and treaty port communities.  Different groups, whether Qing, foreign 
communities, foreign metropolitan governments or Chinese nationalists, sought to encourage 
distinct interpretations of the events based on their views on the continuing role of foreigners 
in China.   
 
   This article will argue that to understand the evolution of collective memories in a 
transnational, and multi-lingual, environment, we have to conceive of them as 
‘multidirectional’.14  That is to say, memories are not always in competition with each other.  
While commemorations often provoke competing narratives, this competition exists within a 
broader framework in which even attempts to emphasise historical memories which other 
communities might not recognise could spark parallel commemoration by those same 
communities.  Foreign individuals and communities in China remembered the Taiping war to 
promote their own achievements, or to make the case for their continued relevance to the 
country’s development.  Importantly, these commemorations were not just the efforts to shore 
up foreign legitimacy in China that Robert Bickers has documented.
15
  As they drew on a 
critical moment in Qing history they were open to contributions and challenges from 
successive generations of Chinese.   Conflicts occurred principally when commemorations 
took material rather than written form, and thus carried meaning across linguistic boundaries.  
The range of attempts to shape collective memories of the foreign role in the Taiping war 
over time highlight the plurality of groups involved, both foreign and Chinese, as well as 
reflecting the changing nature of alliances of interest on the China coast.    
 
   I will trace commemorations of the foreign role in the Taiping war broadly chronologically 
as they played out through three distinct media which together illustrate the changes in that 
memory over time.  The first contentious site of commemoration was the issuing of medals to 
foreign fighters for their service to the Qing.  These medals, deliberately modelled on British 
awards and therefor having the potential to undermine the British honours system, caused as 
much conflict within the British community over whether they could be worn as between 
British and Qing officials.  The second form of commemoration was the construction of 
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monuments to the foreign dead.  These monuments were often constructed by Qing officials 
keen to promote their own role in leading foreign troops as well as to encourage a policy of 
adopting foreign support to reform the empire. Newspaper reports and travelogues suggest 
that these monuments, once constructed were largely ignored by Chinese and foreigners alike.  
Nevertheless, remaining on the landscape, they became sites of renewed attention in the 
1920s and 1930s, largely when they were threatened with demolition.  Finally, consciousness 
of the significance of these monuments, either as reminders of continued foreign dominance 
or of past foreign sacrifices for China, was fostered by the foreign and Chinese histories of 
the Taiping war.  Commemorations of intervention served as a proxy for the negotiation of 
the foreign role in a China which remained, until 1943 when extraterritoriality was abrogated, 
a site of divided, and contested, sovereignty.
16
   
 
Medals for the Men 
 
   The very first attempt to commemorate the service of foreign fighters, the issuing of war 
medals by Qing officials, demonstrates the divisions among different groups with interest in 
foreign relations with China which made later memories of the interventions so unstable.  
The first such division was between foreign states and their citizens in China based both on 
different views of the foreign role in China as well as on class distinctions.  While many 
British soldiers in particular wanted to be rewarded for their contribution, their government 
wished to forget its decision to encourage British citizens to become involved in a Chinese 
civil war altogether.  After a number of controversies, including the murder by Qing troops of 
Taiping prisoners whose surrender a British army officer had negotiated, Prime Minister Lord 
Palmerston declared in parliament that intervention in China had failed.
17
  Requests for 
British medals for veterans of the conflict, similar to those offered to soldiers who had fought 
in the Arrow War (1856-60) in China, were swiftly rejected because their service against the 
Taiping was not ‘of sufficient importance’. 18    In addition to differing ideas about the 
significance of their contribution, veterans disagreed with the diplomatic establishment about 
the form any commemoration should take.  Veterans wished to be remembered using forms, 
such as British-style medals, which they recognised, and many Qing officials, perhaps 
following a long-standing Qing tradition of patronage of other cultures within their empire, 
saw no problem with this.
19
  For senior British diplomats in China and the British government, 
however, disagreeable attempts to remember a policy they wished to forget were 
compounded by what appeared to be an attempt to imitate, and hence undermine, the British 
honours system. 
 
   Initial Qing attempts to reward the foreigners in their service using their own 
commemorative practices were largely unsuccessful.  These took a variety of forms including 
issuing merit medals (功牌 gongpai) and signifiers of rank such as hat buttons (頂戴 dingdai), 
feathers (翎 ling) and official clothes, most famously what foreigners called the ‘yellow 
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riding jacket’ (黃馬褂 huang magua).  These efforts were often attempts to encourage loyalty 
among the foreign troops under Qing command rather than to commemorate services already 
rendered. The Qing court bestowed a fourth grade martial hat button (四品武職頂戴 sipin 
wuzhi dingdai) on the American fighter Frederick Townsend Ward in the same month that 
they accepted his service leading a force of Chinese troops they had dubbed the ‘Ever 
Victorious Army’ (常勝軍, Changshengjun).20  Some foreign fighters clearly valued these 
awards.  Most notable was Charles Gordon who led the Ever Victorious Army after Ward’s 
death in battle in 1862.  On receiving the yellow riding jacket signifying his status as one of 
the emperor’s imperial body guard, he proudly told his mother that ‘I think the Chinese 
government trusts me more than any foreigner ever has been trusted.’21  Most British fighters 
however, rejected these awards in favour of forms of commemoration they understood, such 
as British-styled military medals, and went as far as advising Qing officials on how to adapt 
their versions to more closely reflect British awards.   
   In early 1863 Li Hongzhang, then governor of Jiangsu, proposed the creation of foreign-
style medals to resolve the problem, noted by Prince Gong, one of the regents of the Tongzhi 
emperor, that foreign fighters saw Qing awards as ‘empty of status’ (虚名 xuming).22  British 
consular and military officials played a role in shaping his proposals.  The British consul at 
Shanghai, Walter Medhurst, was dismissive of the first medals proposed, complaining that 
the square holes in the middle of them made them resemble Qing copper cash currency.  He 
suggested that British officers would only be happy with ‘something more in the shape of an 
order’, that is to say medals resembling existing British military orders.23  The officers thus 
drew up their own proposals [figure 1] which Medhurst passed on to Li.  The surviving 
medals strongly suggest that Li acted on this advice.  The square hole in the original medal 
[figure 2, a later example issued to French forces], was removed by the time later medals 
were cast.  Additionally, the yellow and green colour scheme on the ribbon of one of 
Medhurst’s proposed medals is identical to that on medals issued in 1865, at the end of the 
Taiping campaign [figure 3].   
   A similar, though apparently separate, process took place at Tianjin highlighting the 
decentralised nature of the Qing state.  In March 1863 the Nian, a distinct group of rebels 
from the Taiping but intermittently allied with them, advanced on the city.
24
 Captain Coney, a 
British military officer then in charge of training Qing troops at the port, and acting British 
consul John Gibson, rode out to meet them with the newly drilled force.  After a short 
exchange of fire, and a charge by a Mongolian cavalry unit, the rebels fled.
25
  Chonghou, then 
trade minister for the northern ports of Tianjin, Niuzhuang and Yantai, consulted Gibson 
about appropriate awards for his service.  Gibson declared that he did not want traditional 
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Chinese rewards or Qing titles but instead only wanted a merit medal.
26
  On investigating 
further Chonghou developed a new system of Chinese awards, distinct from those established 
by Li for the 1862 campaign.  He noted that he had discovered, presumably after consultation 
with Gibson, that ‘foreigners are partial to having precious stars (寶星 baoxing)’.27  The term 
is possibly a transliteration of the British ‘Order of the Bath’ taken from the text of the Treaty 
of Tianjin because two British officials mentioned in the text were members of that order.
28
  
Gibson, and presumably the military officials who received the award, wanted something that 
resembled an English order which might provide them with status among their peers.  Indeed, 
despite criticism of the medals by senior British officials, the award became popularly known 
as ‘the order of the dragon’.29 
Almost as soon as the ‘precious stars’ were issued, senior British diplomats sought to 
prevent their citizens from accepting them.  This action should be understood in the context 
of the nature and purpose of the British honours system.  In Britain honours arose from the 
system of knighthood, a form of military honour recognising service in battle.
30
 Although, by 
the Stuart period (1603-1714), knighthood had lost this functional role, the titles remained as 
one of the building blocks of the honours system.
31
   These awards operated within a status 
marketplace.  An honours system which gave out too many honours, as the administrators of 
the Prussian system did in the late nineteenth century, would undermine the prestige of the 
status it was created to confer.
32
  By the mid-nineteenth century the British honours system 
had the dual functions of ensuring the loyalty of those upon whom titles were conferred, as 
well as reinforcing class hierarchies.  It is not a coincidence that the Order of the Star of India, 
conferred on both British and Indian administrators, was created shortly after the Indian 
rebellion was suppressed.
33
  Similarly, in the 1860s the British government re-established the 
Order of St Michael and St George for colonial officials elsewhere in order to inspire a sense 
of belonging, and loyalty, to the metropolitan government.
34
  The British Empire was, in 
David Cannadine’s words, ‘ornamentalist’, as it sought to structure its territories along the 
same class lines as those in the metropole.
35
 
    As a result of the honours system’s importance, the acceptance of foreign orders was 
rigorously policed. Regulations on accepting foreign awards were revised 1855, probably in 
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response to the service by British subjects in the forces of foreign armies during the Crimean 
conflict. The regulations were explicitly referred to by officials responding to requests from 
recipients to wear medals bestowed by the Qing for service in the Taiping war.
36
  The 
regulations were based on a distinction between orders, which implied lifelong membership 
of a group patronised by the monarch, such as the order of the garter, and medals which were 
awarded for specific military achievements.  The first clause of regulations on foreign orders 
stated that no British subject could accept a foreign order without the Queen’s permission.  
Medals, meanwhile, could be accepted without consulting the government, but could not be 
worn without the Queen’s permission.37  Another clause made the ultimate purpose of the 
legislation clear.  Permission to wear medals or orders did not authorise ‘the assumption of 
any style, appellation, rank, precedence or privilege appertaining to a Knight Bachelor of Her 
Majesty’s Realms.’38  The awarding of foreign honours and medals had to be policed because 
such awards, particularly when they were designed to resemble British orders, risked 
undermining the hierarchical structures reinforced by the domestic honours system.  These 
regulations were also rigidly enforced outside China. In 1856, soon after the regulations were 
updated, citizens of Glasgow were refused permission to wear the Légion d’Honneur 
bestowed by Louis Napoleon because the work they had carried out for the Paris grand 
exhibition was not of a military nature.
39
   
Senior diplomats’ refusal to grant British subjects permission to wear Qing medals were 
not based just on a fear of the undermining the British honours system. They were also a 
result of specific anxieties about the class of recipient which highlight the divisions within the 
British presence in China.  Rutherford Alcock, then British Minister in China, noted that the 
medals were to be rejected because ‘The decoration in question…is not an imperial order but 
an imitation of the stars conferred on members of foreign orders devised by a provincial 
governor and by him bestowed…upon all [emphasis added] foreigners’ who had fought 
against the rebels.
40
  Alongside British army officers, many of the British fighters in the Qing 
ranks, to use Charles Gordon’s description of his own men, were ‘not gentlemen’.41  That is 
to say, they were not of the officer class.  As well as a failure to be discerning, Qing officials 
were often discerning in the wrong way.  When Chonghou wished to bestow a higher ranking 
medal upon Consul Gibson than that accorded to Captain Coney, who had actually led troops 
in battle, Lord Bruce, British Minister in China from 1860-64, refused to allow Gibson to 
accept the award.  Bruce argued he could not ‘assent to the Chinese notion of putting the 
services of a civilian official above those of a military officer for conduct in the field’.42  For 
the highest ranking British diplomatic officials the new Chinese orders were inadequate 
because, as Thomas Wade, who succeeded Bruce as British Minister, suggested, in their view 
Qing officials simply did not understand the ‘nature and purpose’ of decorations.43    
Criticism of the medals by senior diplomats, and refusal to grant permission to wear them 
did not diminish their lustre in the eyes of recipients, who wished to be remembered for their 
service at a time when this was exactly what the British government wished to forget.  
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Gordon was still dealing with letters from his former officers requesting medals in 1871, 
seven years after his force disbanded.
44
  Some such requests had to be refused, as in the case 
of Colonel Rhode, whose distinction in fighting for the Qing was somewhat diminished by 
his subsequent service in the rebel lines.
45
  A Mr Ferns complained to the admiralty that he 
had been issued with a large silver medal for his services which was supposed to be passed 
on to him by Commander Boyle.  The unscrupulous commander, however, had allegedly had 
it melted down and recast in a smaller size leaving Ferns with a mere ‘miniature’ version.46  
Among British subjects outside of the diplomatic establishment, who were unlikely to receive 
similar recognition from their own state for service against the Taiping, the baubles of the 
Qing were much in demand.  Interestingly, this does not appear to have been the case for 
French fighters, with no major conflict over the issuing of medals surviving in French 
consular archives.  Indeed, Zuo Zongtang, who oversaw the French-led Chinese force, the 
Ever Triumphant Army, noted that his fighters were uninterested in the new form medals.
47
  
This is perhaps because they were styled on British, rather than French, awards and so held 
no special attraction to French fighters. 
In addition to creating conflict between British soldiers and their government the medals 
also created conflicts within the Qing government over their mode of distribution, in turn 
leading to further criticism of the new medals from foreign observers.  For the central Qing 
government, headed by the three regents of the child Tongzhi emperor, Prince Gong and the 
dowager empresses Ci An and Ci Xi, foreign style medals were a way of ensuring equal 
rewards so that different groups of foreigners did not feel slighted.  When Zuo asked the 
court how his French fighters should be rewarded, he was told that they should receive the 
same medals as the British.
48
  This attempt to create a unified system of rewards for 
foreigners was frustrated at a time when the central court was, in any case, losing some of its 
power to its generals in the provinces.
49
 Zuo refused to issue the same medals as his 
counterparts in other provinces, regarding them as too expensive.
50
  The end result was the 
issuing of seven distinct styles of medal over the course of the campaign.
51 
 Equally open to 
dispute was the mode of conferral of the medals.  Some local Qing officials arranged, at the 
request of their foreign recipients, to have the medals bestowed by the central government.
52
 
Zuo, however, flatly refused, arguing that if awards were directly issued by the central 
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government they may cause foreigners to be ‘disrespectful to our empire’s prestige’ (亵國體 
xie guoti).
53
  These disagreements over how to commemorate the foreign role in the war 
would reflect wider policy differences among Qing officials about the role foreigners might 
play in the country after it. 
The nuance of this difference of opinion among officials was lost on foreign officials for 
whom the issue of direct contact with the Qing emperor was a long running sore.  The British 
and French ministers dismissed the awards because they did not come directly from the 
emperor.
54
  This was despite the fact that such medals were to be stamped with the words 
‘imperially bestowed’ (御賜 yu ci) and that, in practice, all officials memorialised the regents 
of the Tongzhi emperor to request permission before bestowing any form of award.
55
  The 
perceived local control over the issue of awards ran contrary to the entire rationale of foreign 
honours systems, in which the monarch was the fountain of honours, which were often 
bestowed by him or her in person and were thus a sign of their personal favour.
56
 It will also 
have reminded foreign officials of the supposed aloofness of the Qing court at a time when 
they were trying to organise the protocols for an audience with the emperor.  No audience 
had been held since Lord Amherst’s shambolic mission to China in 1816 when he was barred 
from access to the emperor because he refused to perform the koutou.
57
  After the Arrow War 
the audience question was deferred by the death of the Xianfeng emperor in 1861 and his 
replacement by the child Tongzhi emperor, with whom no audience could be held until he 
reached maturity.  In this context the differences of opinion among Qing officials over the 
type of medals to award and their mode of bestowal was interpreted as yet another technique 
for delaying foreigners access to the emperor to preserve his prestige. 
  The issuing of medals as a commemoration of the service of foreign soldiers was fraught 
with difficulties because of the array of different interest groups in China, with clear 
disagreements among both Chinese and foreign groups about the foreign role in the country.  
The British government’s representatives wished to forget their foray into a Chinese civil war 
and even more so as the soldiers they had tacitly permitted to join the Qing ended up causing 
more harm than good.  A number of fighters who had initially fought for the Qing switched 
sides for the promise of better pay, leading the North-China Herald, to dub them ‘the dregs of 
society’.58   While these men sought foreign-style medals to commemorate their service, 
senior officers were often dismissive of them.  Gordon allegedly sold his medal to raise funds 
for victims of the Lancashire cotton famine, while, as we have seen, he held Qing awards 
such as the yellow riding jacket, a recognition of status on the dynasty’s own terms, in high 
regard.
59
  In awarding medals, Qing officials mainly sought to reward foreign fighters either 
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to pacify their demands for increased pay or to ensure their loyalty.  Even then there was 
disagreement between officials about whether foreign service merited a whole new form of 
medal and mode of bestowal, with Zuo Zongtang resolutely resisting the proposal.  When 
acts of commemoration take physical form they become ensnared in the constraints and 
meanings of those forms.  These debates, and those over whether foreign interventions in 
China’s affairs should be commemorated at all, continued when discussion turned from 
rewards for the living to memorials to the dead. 
Monumental Memories 
The monuments to the foreign dead, constructed both by Qing and foreign actors, gave rise 
to disputes which, unlike those over the Taiping war medals, had a long afterlife.  Scholars of 
memorial structures have noted that, once built, they can either continue to be sites of active 
commemoration, be disavowed through destruction or neglect or become contested.
60
 Given 
their obvious presence on the landscape allowing monuments to fall into disrepair suggests 
neglect of the memories they represent.  The fate of three Taiping war monuments highlights 
both the number of interest groups with a stake in the memory of the foreign role in the war 
and the multi-directional nature of commemoration in a transnational environment: a 
memorial hall to Frederick Townsend Ward, an obelisk celebrating the Anglo-French 
recapture of Ningbo and a soldier’s cemetery at Shanghai.  The creation and reception of 
these monuments was heavily influenced by the changing nature of Sino-foreign alliances 
and antagonisms over time.  In the decade after the war both the foreign community in China 
and Qing officials were minded to celebrate the foreign dead even if they sometimes 
disagreed over the form these commemorations should take.  By the 1920s, with the Qing 
dynasty overthrown and Chinese nationalism on the rise, the collective memory of the 
Taiping war was far less settled. 
Qing officials’ efforts to commemorate the foreign dead built on an established but 
evolving Qing memorial culture.  In the Qianlong reign (1735-96) monuments to Qing 
conquests were placed strategically, as in Guangxi province, where they might serve as a 
solid reminder to rebellious locals of Qing authority.
61
  Shrines were also constructed to 
commemorate loyal officials, such as Guan Tianpei, who died at Humen in 1841 resisting the 
foreign advance on Canton during the Opium War.
62
  The scale of the Taiping war, and the 
loss of life resulting from it, led the Xianfeng emperor in 1853 to decentralise the creation of 
memorials which had hitherto been the prerogative of the court.
63
  Local officials, such as 
Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, used their new power to commemorate their own role in 
winning the war, as distinct from the contribution of the central Qing state, in order to bolster 
their own reputation.  From the early 1860s onward Li oversaw the construction of memorials 
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(Leiden: Brill, 2012), 167-92, pp.174-5. 
63
 Tobie S. Meyer-Fong, What Remains, p.143 
to the Huai army which he commanded and which was responsible for the recapture of much 
of Jiangsu from the Taiping.
64
   
The different origins of the memorials to the foreign dead highlight shared Qing and 
foreign efforts at commemoration of the war in its immediate aftermath even if there were 
disagreements over their form.  The construction of Ward’s memorial hall seems to have 
been part of Li’s efforts to promote his own role in winning the war.  It was not the only one.  
He also constructed a monument to the Ever Victorious Army as a whole which was resented 
by the foreign community because of its insufficient grandeur.
65
 The Ward memorial’s 
construction was delayed for fourteen years because the American Chargé d’Affaires, Samuel 
Wells Williams, originally a missionary, resisted what he saw as an attempt at the pagan 
deification of Ward.
 66 
 The imposing Ningbo obelisk, commemorating the Anglo-French 
recapture of the city, was also constructed by local Qing officials perhaps bolstering their 
own reputations or, as was the case with other commemorative efforts which took place while 
the war was ongoing, to placate the foreigners still in their service.
 67 
The final memorial to be 
discussed, the soldier’s cemetery at Shanghai [figure 4], was constructed by the international 
settlement’s foreign-run Municipal Council.  It was initially a practical space, housing some 
300 soldiers and sailors buried without individual tombstones, who had largely died of 
Cholera, between 1862-65.
68
  This was to change when the space, as with the Ward and 
Ningbo monuments, became contested in the 1930s. 
The monuments built in the 1860s and 1870s were largely ignored between 1880 and 1920, 
perhaps because this was a period in which the foreign communities in China felt relatively 
secure in their privileged position in the country.  Characteristic of this absence of 
commemoration was the failure to create a memorial following the death of Charles Gordon 
at Khartoum in 1885 while serving the Egyptian Khedive fighting another group of 
religiously-inspired rebels.  One reason for this was probably the existence of the Ever 
Victorious Army monument, though, as highlighted, it was not favourably received by 
foreigners. On receiving news of Gordon’s death members of the foreign community did 
consider constructing their own memorial but it was decided that the funds raised for this 
purpose should instead be used to support Gordon’s relatives.69  This failure to commemorate 
Gordon was symptomatic of a disinterest in his activities in China.  When, in 1880, news 
circulated that Gordon planned to return to China, some treaty port newspapers could not 
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even correctly report which group of rebels he had helped suppress.
70
 This was in stark 
contrast to Gordon’s reception at home.  Gordon’s death in part led to a rewriting, usually by 
metropolitan historians, of histories of the foreign role in the Taiping war.  Gordon himself 
was interred in St Paul’s Cathedral and his service in China was commemorated with the 
polite fiction, engraved in gold on his tomb, that ‘with his warlike genius he saved an 
empire’.71   
The relative neglect of Gordon was not indicative of a lack of interest in commemoration 
from the 1880s, but perhaps a lack of interest in the memory of the Taiping war specifically, 
as the commemoration of other heroes of the foreign community illustrates. The first such 
hero, Augustus Margary, was a British vice-consul who was ambushed and killed while 
returning from a covert diplomatic mission to Burma.  The British community in Shanghai 
formed a committee in December 1875 to discuss commemorating Margary, and unveiled a 
statue in his honour in Shanghai in 1880.
72
  Similarly, the British community were moved by 
the death in office in 1885 of the British Minister in China Harry Parkes, who they saw as an 
uncompromising proponent of their interests.  A statue in his honour was unveiled on the 
Bund in 1890.
73
  As with Margary, Parkes was commemorated for what he represented, a 
forceful British hand in China. These commemorations took place at a time when the British 
government in London supported the interests of their subjects in China.  Indeed, the Margary 
affair was used to extract more concessions from the Qing government in the form of the 
Chefoo convention.
74
 Gordon, however, represented foreign sacrifice for Chinese interests, a 
message with less salience for the attitudes and ambitions of the British community of the 
1880s.   
The ‘reawakening’ of the Taiping memorials from the 1920s should be seen in the context 
of changing visions of China’s place in the international order.  Following the First World 
War, the British American and French governments began to consider, on the urging of the 
Chinese government, the renegotiation of their citizen’s extraterritorial rights in China. 
Extraterritoriality, or the right of exemption from Qing law, had been perceived by the 
foreign community to be a cornerstone of their presence in China since it was granted in 1843.   
Negotiations to end it were sped up by the events of May 30 1925.  The Shanghai Students 
Federation organised a protest in the international settlement in response to the murder of a 
striking mill worker by a Japanese foreman.
75
  When protesters reached a police station on 
Nanking road, a police inspector gave orders to fire.  11 students were killed and a further 20 
were seriously wounded.
76
  The incident sparked mass anti-foreign protests, demonstrating to 
senior foreign diplomats that the demands of Chinese nationalists had to be taken seriously.  
The same year saw the founding of the Shanghai British Residents Association, an 
organization aimed at resisting moves to sell out their interests in the country.
77
  One 
journalist encapsulated the perceived role of the foreign community in China, complaining 
that ‘Foreigners are doing nothing but good works for China and the Chinese … the Chinese 
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are in some respect like Children who have not yet grown up and are only partially 
civilised’.78  
   The American community in Shanghai in this period shared these concerns but was also 
increasingly conscious of the need to assert its own identity, which may have influenced the 
first commemorations of the Taiping war.  Between 1911 and 1924 the American population 
in China saw a 154 per cent increase, compared with only a 43 per cent increase for the 
British.
79
  This encouraged the remembrance of a specifically American community history 
in the city.  By the 1910s foreign observers noted that Ward’s tomb had been entirely 
neglected and was being used as a venue for Daoist rituals.
80
   During the 1920s however, the 
site became the location for an annual pilgrimage made by the American community.  The 
roots of this new activity lay the need of veterans living in Shanghai to participate in 
American memorial activity following the First World War.  This reflected a rise in interest 
in public remembrance after the war, with an emphasis on memorial sites reflecting 
community grief rather than glorious national victories.
81
  In 1919, the veteran’s organisation 
the American legion was established for this purpose.  Branches were soon set-up around the 
world including at Shanghai in 1920.
82
  The group’s membership voted to call its branch the 
Frederick Townsend Ward Post because Ward remained the most notable American citizen to 
have died fighting in China.
83
  On American Memorial Day 1921 the post arranged a 
pilgrimage to Ward’s tomb, an event the post’s commander described as part of its 
‘Americanization programme’, underlining its importance for emphasising the distinct 
American role in the country.
84
  All of the key American dignitaries in Shanghai attended, 
including the Consul General and Commander H.I. Cone, Chief of Staff of the US Asiatic 
Fleet.
85
   
     Although Ward’s tomb was initially reinvigorated as a useful focal point for Memorial 
Day commemorations, as the 1920s progressed the site took on a new meaning.  The tomb, 
gradually restored, became almost proxy US territory and Ward’s memory was taken to 
remind US citizens of their role in China.  In 1923, as part of the Memorial Day celebrations, 
a granite memorial tablet bearing the US shield was installed at the tomb, presumably funded 
by subscriptions from the Ward post, as were subsequent renovations.
86
  In 1924 another 
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memorial was unveiled and a fund of $300 was contributed by the Legion to establish a troop 
of boy scouts at Songjiang who, in return, would keep the tomb well maintained.
87
  Shortly 
before the May 30 incident, at the annual meeting at Ward’s tomb, Judge Purdy, Chief Justice 
of the US Supreme Court for China, used Ward’s memory in his eulogy to remind those 
gathered of their duty to the Chinese.  He argued that Ward had been at the vanguard of a 
civilizing mission which Americans had a duty to continue in China so that it could become 
one of the ‘splendid galaxy of self-governing nations encircling the pacific’.88  In four years, 
Ward had gone from forgotten figure to honoured emblem of the US’s role in China.  Visits 
to his tomb continued annually until 1937. These were not small affairs: on the final visit in 
1937 around 100 Americans took part.
89
 After 1937, as a result of the Japanese invasion of 
China, the pilgrimage was, however, abandoned. 
      The extent of the renewed significance of Ward’s tomb for the American community was 
revealed by their response to threats to it from the Japanese. Members of the Legion had 
worried that Ward’s tomb was not clearly marked as American property, and was thus not to 
be interfered with.  On 25 May 1938 two officers of the Ward Post raced in a Red Cross truck 
towards the site armed with paint and a large American flag.  On arrival they hoisted the flag 
and painted a duplicate which they draped over his tomb.
90
  For good measure the American 
consul-general at Shanghai sought, and received, assurances from Japanese consular officials 
that precautions would be taken to ensure that the tomb was not damaged. The politics of 
Ward’s remembrance had more to do with contemporary circumstances than either with the 
man or his deeds.  Although the symbolic marking of Ward’s tomb was a reaffirmation of 
American interests in China, the event also marked an actual spatial retreat.  No further 
pilgrimages were held until after the end of the Second World War.  Although efforts were 
later made by the Ward post’s former commander to establish American ownership of the site, 
these were overtaken by events.
91
  When the Communists captured Shanghai in 1949 the post 
went into exile, where it remains.
92
  Ward’s remains were reportedly dug up by the CCP in 
1955 and the tomb was paved over, though Songjiang locals apparently remembered its 
earlier existence as late as the 1990s.
93
 
   The Soldier’s Cemetery at Shanghai, a site of commemoration for the British community, 
followed a similar pattern to that of Ward’s tomb and was perhaps encouraged by renewed 
commemorations there.  As early as the late 1880s, just twenty-five years after the bodies 
were first buried, the missionary Arthur Moule highlighted the graves’ neglect.94  In 1912 and 
again in 1924 further complaints about the cemetery were also made to the Shanghai 
Municipal Council, the body governing the International Settlement.
95
  In 1938 the Council 
finally acted, announcing the bodies would be moved to the Hongqiao Cemetery.  A key 
rationale for this was that the old graveyard was now part of the Nandao refugee zone.
96
  The 
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dead of the Taiping war, neglected for so long, were to be rescued from the chaos of the Sino-
Japanese conflict.  The reburial did not pass without ‘an impressive military ceremony’.97  
The bronze plate attached to the new memorial stated that the decision to move the bodies 
had been taken to ‘secure from violation their last earthly resting place’.98  Symbolically and 
spatially the removal represented a retreat of British interests within the confines of the 
international settlement’s existing cemeteries.  Although linked to a wider change in attitudes 
to war graves after the First World War, the move was also intended as a mark of respect to 
men who had, in the North-China Herald’s words, died having ‘fought China’s battles’.99  As 
in the case of Ward, those long dead served to highlight the continued purpose of the foreign 
communities at the time of their greatest insecurity. 
     A strikingly similar process of reaffirmation in the face of spatial retreat can be seen in the 
fate of the Anglo-French obelisk at Ningbo.  The monument was not entirely ignored after its 
construction.  In 1906 a British naval captain, acting on instructions from the Commander-in-
Chief of the China station, oversaw refurbishment works paid for by the British, French and 
Qing governments.  Other than this, little interest was shown in the monument by either the 
British or French communities until the nationalist government threatened to demolish it in 
the 1930s.  Instead the foreign community paid for the removal of the obelisk from the 
Chinese city to the foreign cemetery across the river.
 100
  The removal of the monument, and 
the ceremony to mark its re-dedication in the foreign cemetery were intimately bound up with 
resistance to the nationalist campaign to limit foreign influence in the country.  The chairman 
of the foreign cemetery committee noted that the monument had been moved because ‘owing 
to changed and changing conditions’ it had become ‘a source of embarrassment to the 
Chinese authorities.’  At the ceremony the British consul suggested that the Anglo-French 
recapture of Ningbo highlighted both countries’ role ‘as the defenders of civilisation against 
the forces of disorder’ outside of Europe.  If memories of the foreign role in the Taiping war 
were a ‘source of embarrassment’ to the nationalist administration, they invoked ideas for 
some in the foreign community of their raison d’être in China. 
The monuments to the foreign dead attracted uneven attention over time, reflecting the 
changing relations between the foreign communities in the treaty ports and their Chinese 
hosts as well as changing global memorial practices.  Initially the foreign community in 
China and Qing officials both saw a need to commemorate the dead.  Indeed, Qing officials 
reportedly continued to pay homage at Ward’s tomb into the twentieth century, long after it 
had been neglected by the American community.
101
  These may even have been the ‘Daoist 
rituals’ that a foreign sojourner noted as a sign of the tomb’s neglect.  The fall of the Qing in 
1911, the rise in Chinese nationalism in the 1920s and the changes in European and American 
memorial cultures following World War One all changed this.  The monuments, as part of the 
foreign communities’ archival memory, were reinvigorated to remember a forgotten history. 
This was a history with the salient lesson that the foreign community had been and could 
remain a stabilising force in a chaotic country.  This was all the more potent because the 
1920s and 1930s were a time of fighting between Chinese groups, whether warlord factions 
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or nationalists and communists, just as the 1860s had been.  This commemorative activity 
ceased when the foreign community itself departed after the Communists took full control in 
1949.  The monuments themselves appear to have disappeared in the chaotic thirty years that 
followed, before the country began its post-Mao reforms.
102
  Conflicts over the positioning of 
the memorials to the foreign dead did not arise in isolation.   They were also born out in, and 
perhaps influenced by, the changing narratives within written histories of the events. 
Written Histories 
  The writing of histories of the intervention, unlike medals and statues, did not prompt 
disputes between Chinese and foreign agents or states.  Medals and monuments, as visual 
symbols, could give rise to disputes between groups who spoke different languages in a way 
in which written word accounts could not.  Nevertheless, histories of the intervention kept 
alive their memory for mono-linguistic audiences, and could still serve specific agendas at the 
expense of others.  English language histories of the intervention were shaped by the death of 
Gordon, who emerged in popular memory as the British hero who saved China.  The 
multidirectional nature of commemoration in a transnational environment meant that this 
inspired American historians to review the life of Ward.  This revision of history may have 
provided inspiration for the American legion’s visits to his tomb.  Tobie Meyer-Fong has 
highlighted that the disputes between local Qing officials and populations and the central 
Qing court over how to celebrate victory over the Taiping continued until the fall of the Qing.  
Nonetheless these efforts elided the fact that not all of the Jiangnan population, or even all of 
the ruling local elite, had backed the dynasty.
103
  The dispute about the foreign role in the war 
continued beyond the fall of the dynasty at least until foreign treaty privileges in the country 
were terminated.  As a new generation emerged in Jiangnan, one committed to Chinese 
nationalism, their histories suggested that their predecessors had stood with, rather than 
against, the Taiping, just as they stood against foreign dominance in the country. 
The first Anglophone history of the foreign role in the war reflected a prevailing belief 
among British policy makers in the need to collaborate with the Qing to ensure order in China, 
an order the Taiping armies had threatened.
104
  The “Ever Victorious Army”, was published 
in 1868 by Andrew Wilson who had already authored strident criticisms of Britain’s 
belligerent Opium War era stance towards the Qing Empire.
105
  He explicitly stated he had 
written his history to promote the British government’s new policy of supporting and 
strengthening the Qing state.
106
  He hoped to do so by dispelling the myth, propagated by the 
Times amongst other sources, that the Ever Victorious Army had somehow won the Taiping 
war for the Qing.
107
  By presenting the Qing as a capable military force in their own right, 
Wilson was inferring that their continuing efforts to stabilise the country were worthy of 
British support.  The almost twenty-year silence following Wilson’s account was at least in 
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part influenced by the controversy which still surrounded the interventions, particularly after 
the Qing massacre of Taiping prisoners at Suzhou in 1863. 
This narrative changed following Gordon’s death at Khartoum in January 1885, ushering in 
a wave of hagiographies which highlight the multi-directional nature of memory in a 
transnational environment.  Gordon’s death transformed him into the imperial martyr par 
excellence, particularly as Gladstone’s government had prevaricated about getting involved, 
leaving it too late to dispatch a relief force to rescue him.  The flurry of publications after his 
death portrayed Gordon, with more or less nuance, as the saviour of the Qing.
108
  This was 
partly because these works were not histories but were instead representative of the 
bombastic nature of much Victorian biography, later skewered by Lynton Strachey as 
‘tedious panegyric[s]’.109  Nevertheless, the change in narrative after Gordon’s death and the 
passage of time detoxified discussion of the rebellion, resulting in a flurry of memoirs from 
the late 1880s.
110
  The Gordon hagiographies, and nationalistic rivalries, had a 
multidirectional impact, stimulating a revival of interest in Frederick Townsend Ward.
111
  
These works, all by American authors, stressed that Ward had been ‘overlooked by fame’ and 
that while he was dismissed as an adventuring mercenary, Gordon had not been treated ‘an 
actual man, but a figure in stained glass’.112  Regardless of their rival national heroes, both 
sets of works had the same overall effect: countering Wilson’s account and recasting the 
Taiping war as one which foreigners had won for the Qing.  When foreign communities in 
China began celebrating the dead of the Taiping war again in the 1920s and 1930s, it was this 
account they remembered.  The narrative’s few detractors, such as William Hail, who 
protested not unreasonably in the pages of the North-China Herald that Zeng Guofan’s 
armies would have won the war with or without foreign help, only serve to highlight its 
dominance.
113
   
While Anglophone histories and biographies moved from downplaying the foreign role in 
the Taiping war to eulogising it, surviving Chinese narratives moved in the opposite direction.  
Immediately after the war Qing historians appear to have promoted the foreign role in the war, 
at a time when foreign support was being sought to implement reforms within the empire. 
Their work should be placed in the context of long-standing Chinese historiographical 
traditions, adopted by the Qing, in which history served a dual purpose.  Firstly, historians 
were tasked with providing an accurate record of past events. Court historians kept diarised 
records which were kept from a ruler’s eyes to prevent him editing interpretations of events 
of which he did not approve.  During the Spring and Autumn period (770 BCE – 476 BCE) a 
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grand historian recorded that Cui Zhu, first minister of the state of Qi, had murdered his 
brother.  On reading this Cui demanded the line be removed.  The historian refused and was 
executed, only to be replaced by his younger brother who recorded the same detail.  He too 
was killed and the process was repeated until the fourth brother, when Cui finally accepted 
that history could not be altered according to his whims.
114
  Apocryphal though this anecdote 
may be, it illuminates the tradition in which Qing historians saw themselves to be working.   
Equally important was history’s function as a ‘mirror to aid government’.115    Historians 
were expected to illustrate the ideal social order by apportioning praise and blame to 
noteworthy individuals and actions.
116
   
The only Qing history to focus exclusively on the foreign intervention laid claim to both of 
these traditions and drew on the foreign interventions as a lesson for future policy for the 
government.  The Record of the Foreign Armies (洋兵記略 Yang Bing Jilüe) was compiled 
by Dong Xun, a minister in the Zongli Yamen, the office managing Qing foreign relations, in 
the mid-1860s.
117
  Dong explicitly affirmed the Record’s accuracy while celebrating the work 
of the foreign soldiers it took for its subjects.
118
 Dong’s work was influenced by his 
background and resulting political beliefs.  Dong had personally witnessed the destruction 
wrought by powerful European armies at the Summer Palace in Beijing against ineffective 
Qing resistance during the Arrow War and was a member of the committee tasked with 
making peace with foreign diplomats. After this he took up an active role in the foreign-
supported reform initiatives underway in the capital including administering the examinations 
at the newly established translators school and inspecting the foreign-trained Peking Field 
Force.
119
  Given Dong’s pro-reform leanings it is unsurprising that he should wish to paint 
such a positive picture of the foreign contribution to the suppression of the Taiping.  His 
account ignored problematic episodes such as the British and French armies’ refusal to fight 
in the summer of 1862 because of what they viewed as Qing ineptitude on the battlefield, and 
instead emphasised their role in breaking the Taiping siege of Shanghai in January of the 
same year.
120
  The Record thus presented the foreign interventions in the best possible light.  
As a factual record, and as a ‘mirror to aid government’, the work aimed to persuade officials 
of the need for foreign-supported reforms.  Published only in Chinese, and apparently 
                                                          
114
 Huang Chun-Chieh, 'The Defining Character of Chinese Historical Thinking', History and Theory, 46, 2 
(2007), 180-88, pp. 180-81. 
115
 The title of a historical work by Northern Song dynasty (960 AD – 1127 AD) historian Sima Guang. See 
Luke S. K. Kwong, 'The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860-1911', 
Past & Present, 173 (2001), 157-90, p. 163. See also On Cho Ng and Q. Edward Wang, Mirroring the Past: The 
Writing and Use of History in Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005). 
116
 Axel Schneider and Stefan Tanaka, 'The Transformation of History in China and Japan', in The Oxford 
History of Historical Writing Volume 4: 1800-1945, ed. by Juan Maiguashca Stuart Macintyre, and Attilla Pók 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 491-519, p. 492. 
117
 Probably while Dong was serving as Vice President of the Records Office, a post he was appointed to on 26 
August 1864.  See Dong Xun, 還讀我書室老人手訂年譜 (Autobiographical Record of the Old man of the 
Study for Returning to Read my Books) ' 近代中國史料叢刊 (Collected Materials on Modern Chinese History)', 
29, (Taipei: Guangwen Shuju, 1971), p. 96. 
118
 Dong Xun, '洋兵紀略 (Record of the Foreign Armies)', in 太平天國文獻彙編 (A Collection of Documents 
on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom), ed. by Jialuo Yang (Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1973), 527-64, p. 564. 
119
 Dong, Autobiographical Record, pp. 92-3 
120
 Dong, 'Record of the Foreign Armies', pp. 536-8 and pp. 540-41. For the foreign withdrawal in the summer 
of 1862 see Staveley to Hope, 13 June 1862, TNA, FO17/384. 
predominantly circulated within official circles since there is no record of wide publication, 
the work was aimed at an audience of Qing policy makers.
121
   
In the first decades after the war it was not just reforming officials who had an interest in 
glossing over the incessant diplomatic spats that the foreign armies’ support in suppressing 
the Taiping had provoked.   For different reasons both local officials and many within the 
Jiangnan elite remembered the interventions positively.  As is evident in the building of 
memorials to both his own armies and foreign fighters, Li Hongzhang, governor of Jiangsu, 
was keen to commemorate the war to highlight his own role in a triumphant victory.  In an 
extension of this strategy he commissioned Du Wenlan’s Record of the Suppression of the 
Southern Rebels (平定粵匪記略 Pingding Yue Fei Jilüe).122  The account praised the foreign 
role in the war while omitting regrettable events which might have cast doubt on Li’s 
management of the Ever Victorious Army, such as the defection of Ward’s immediate 
successor as commander, Henry Burgevine, to the Taiping.
123
  Li was not alone. Similar 
details were also omitted from the history sections of local gazetteers, guidebooks written by 
officials for officials who frequently moved from one part of the empire to another, as an 
introduction to their new jurisdiction. The Songjiang prefecture gazetteer, compiled in 1883, 
neglected to mention some of the more lamentable practices of the Ever Victorious Army 
during the period it used the town as its base.
124
  This included Burgevine shutting 
Songjiang’s gates and threatening to behead local officials unless his troops were paid.125  
The omission of these particulars from otherwise detailed accounts may reflect an antipathy 
among the Jiangnan elite towards the Taiping informed not only by the destruction they 
wrought but also by their social prejudices, regarding them as ‘déclassé outsiders’ from the 
poor southern provinces.
126
  Those opposed to them, foreign, Qing and Chinese, were more 
likely to have been treated favourably by the historical record.   
   This positive view of the interventions was echoed in the Chinese language press in the first 
thirty years after the war, suggesting that their readership, Chinese merchants in Shanghai 
and its surroundings, remained grateful for the expulsion of the Taiping.  When Gordon 
returned to China in 1880 the Shenbao, the premier Chinese-language newspaper in Shanghai 
from 1872, reprinted a translated article from the North-China Daily News discussing his 
service against the Taiping and potential new role serving the Qing against Russia.
127
  
Shenbao offered no comment on the article, but its inclusion suggests that the newspaper felt 
that its Chinese readership would be interested in Gordon’s past and present exploits.128 More 
concrete evidence of the continuing interest in Gordon amongst a Chinese readership in 
Shanghai can be found in Dianshizhai pictorial’s coverage of Li Hongzhang’s visit to pay his 
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respects at Gordon’s statue in England in 1896 [figure 5].  Li visited London as part of a 
diplomatic world tour.  The text accompanying the article, in addition to providing details of 
Li’s visit, included effusive praise for Gordon’s service, suggesting China would not find 
another like him in ‘hundreds of thousands of years’.129  The magazine, publishing from 
within the safety of the foreign concessions, was not averse to criticising the Qing 
government, so its editors were not simply following the established Qing narrative of the 
interventions.
 130
  They clearly felt Gordon’s service was of interest to Dianshizhai’s wide 
readership, and that the author’s sentiments might be shared by them. 
 By the mid-1890’s, however, Dianshizhai’s editors, who had been in favour of foreign-
aided technological and military development, were regarded as conservative by a new 
generation of reformers who took a very different line on the foreign interventions against the 
Taiping.
131
 The Qing defeat in the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) bolstered the cause of anti-
Qing reformers and revolutionaries. When the dynasty collapsed in 1911, it was initially 
replaced by revolutionaries who identified the Taiping as their forbears.  The first president 
of the new Republic, Sun Yatsen, was part of the same Hakka (客家 Kejia) minority as Hong 
Xiuquan and, in his youth, was referred to as ‘little Hong’.132  He later claimed that the stories 
he had heard of the Taiping’s battles as a boy had inspired his subsequent revolutionary 
activity.
133
  This led to increased interest in the history of the movement.  Historical research 
on the movement was difficult to conduct in China, however, because the Qing had been so 
effective in extinguishing traces of the rebels, including their surviving documents.  This 
changed in 1921, when new Qing documents on the Taiping were discovered in a private 
family archive. This led the historian Ling Shanqing, who described the Taiping as ‘a ray of 
light, after which we returned to darkness’, to publish an Unofficial History of the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom.
134
     Ling’s work encouraged a flurry of activity among Chinese 
historians keen to travel to libraries across the world collecting surviving Taiping 
documents.
135
  The foreign interventions against the Taiping were remembered by many of 
these scholars as an act of imperialist aggression.
136
   
This revival of the memory of the Taiping civil war was not universally welcomed, 
reflecting the very divisions in Chinese society opened up by the Taiping themselves.  This 
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was particularly the case after Sun’s successor Chiang Kaishek orchestrated a purge of 
communists in 1927. Against this backdrop, for nationalist anti-communists the Taiping 
again fell out of favour.  Chiang gave his soldiers a pamphlet on Zeng Guofan’s suppression 
of the Taiping.  In his forward, he expressed the hope that his generals would be able to crush 
the communists just as Zeng had put down the would-be revolutionaries of earlier times.
137
  
Historians who shared Chiang’s political outlook also began to play down the Taiping and 
hence the role of foreigners in their suppression.
138
  This interpretation was later dismissed as 
‘borderline propaganda’ by Lo Erh-kang, who would become the preeminent Taiping 
historian in communist China.
139
  This division mirrored that which the Taiping themselves 
had opened up within Jiangnan society, between proponents of the status quo and supporters 
of revolution.  Despite the division among historians in the republican period, neither group 
had an interest in actively promoting the foreign role in the Taiping war as both ultimately 
aimed to end foreign treaty privileges in China.  As a result, monuments to it sat 
uncomfortably on the landscape.  
Conclusion  
The changes in memories of the Taiping war reflect changing ideas about the foreign role 
in China over time.  Memories of the Taiping war crossed Assmann’s eighty-year divide 
between the social memory of participants to form a political memory, constructed by interest 
groups through imbuing importance in acts and sites of remembrance.
140
 The memory of the 
war was initially celebrated by Qing officials, members of the Jiangnan elite and by foreign 
veterans if not by their governments.  This convergence in memory of the Taiping war did 
not last as Chinese nationalism rose in prominence and foreign communities in China felt 
threatened. British and American commemorations of the interventions ended with the end of 
the foreign treaty port communities after the Second World War.
141
  After the end of 
extraterritoriality in 1943, and the subsequent departure of almost all foreigners from the 
China coast, sovereignty in the country was no longer divided and the debates over the role of 
foreigners in the Taiping war were no longer transnational.  There were no treaty port 
communities left to cling to their past in order to preserve their future.  Amongst Anglophone 
historians the Taiping movement and the foreign response to it has generated only a handful 
of monographs in almost forty years.
142
  For commemorations to continue they need an 
audience.   
In China, however, only now are efforts to remember the interventions beginning to fade.  
Over the course of the early twentieth century, recollections of the Taiping war had travelled 
in the opposite direction to those of the foreign communities.  In the words of one scholar 
                                                          
137
 Guo Yingjie and He Baogang, 'Reimagining the Chinese Nation: The "Zeng Guofan Phenomenon"', Modern 
China, 25, 2 (1999), 142-70, p. 144. 
138
 For example see Xie Xingyao, 太平天国丛书十三种  (A Collectanea of Thirteen Taiping documents) 
(Beijing: wenhai chubanshe, 1938), p. 82. 
139
 Lo Erh-kang, 太平天国史纲 (A Draft History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom) (Shanghai: Shangwu 
Yinshu Guan, 1936), p.1.  Lo took up a directorship in the PRC’s Institute of Modern History in 1949.   
140
 Assmann, 'Transformations between History and Memory', p.52. 
141
 For an account of the British community’s departure from treaty-port China see Robert Bickers, Britain in 
China: Community, Culture and Colonialism, 1900-49 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 
236-40. 
142
 See Spence, God's Chinese Son, Thomas H. Reilly, The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the 
Blasphemy of Empire (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), Platt, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, 
and Meyer-Fong, What Remains.  In addition to this there have been a couple of biographies of key figures 
including Carr, The Devil Soldier and John Pollock, Gordon: The Man Behind the Legend (London: Constable, 
1993). 
writing in 1940, the Taiping had gone ‘from being a story grandmothers told their 
grandchildren to make them cry, to being a topic of conversation amongst civilised people 
over tea’.143  The Communist leadership took ending China’s ‘century of humiliation’ at the 
hands of foreigners as a keystone of their legitimacy.  Initially, remembering the evils done 
by foreigners, in suppressing the revolutionary potential of Hong Xiuquan’s regime, bolstered 
that narrative.
144
 The changing contemporary fate of the memory of the Taiping, however, is 
most clearly illustrated in the transformation of the museum in their honour in Nanjing.  
Originally it was a site to commemorate the Taiping as anti-imperialist heroes, but in the 
China of the 2010s the government appears to take rather less interest in championing a 
revolt by dispossessed rural communities against an urban ruling elite.  The museum now 
markets itself through the garden in which it is situated, ‘The Best Garden of Old Nanjing’.  
Indeed, it is this alone which is the focus of online reviews by Chinese visitors.
145
  In Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, which lacked the same political imperatives, historians have remained 
interested in the period, questioning whether the Taiping were unique or just another armed 
peasant rebellion, akin to those which have littered China’s dynastic history.146  
The case of the efforts to remember the foreign role in the Taiping war suggests that 
commemoration in a transnational environment can create as many disputes over form as 
they do over content.  In order for events to be remembered beyond the lifespan of their 
participants they must take material form to be stored in a community’s archival memory.  
With an issue as emotive as commemorating war dead, cultural differences can create 
tensions.  The medals issued to foreign fighters and the original Qing plan for Ward’s tomb 
created more conflict because they clashed with British and American expectations about 
these forms than they did as acts of commemoration in themselves.  These conflicts only 
occur when commemorations take a non-linguistic material form.  Histories of the 
interventions helped shape their different readerships’ perspectives on the foreign role in the 
Taiping war, but conflict only arose when efforts to remember the interventions took the form 
of medals and monuments, lacking the divisions in comprehension created by the written 
word. 
 
The divergent recollections of the foreign role in the Taiping war on the China coast also 
reflects the multidirectional nature of memory in a transnational setting.  In an age of 
European and American empire building, China was far from the only extra-European 
territory where western fighters became involved in civil conflicts between rival factions.  
Indeed, as his death at Khartoum highlights, it was not even the only place where Charles 
Gordon became involved in extra-European disputes. What made China different was the 
continuing division of sovereignty into the mid-twentieth century, with distinct foreign 
communities living side by side with a Chinese population amongst which nationalist 
sentiments were rising.  This meant that efforts at commemoration, or in the case of the 
Ningbo monument the deconstruction of commemorations, caused counter-reactions or 
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inspired different memories of the events.  By the 1930s the historian Yang Yitang suggested 
that his history of the Taiping movement had been inspired by a recent trip to Wusong, in the 
suburbs of Shanghai, where he had heard locals reminiscing about how they, seventy years 
previously, had bravely fought the foreign imperialists.
147
  It is most likely that this was the 
‘they’ of political memory, in that members of the community had heard the story and 
identified with it, for they are unlikely to have been methuselah-esque veterans themselves.
148
  
The fact that actual Taiping supporters in Shanghai in the 1860s were in short supply did not 
matter.  The political memory of the period did. 
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